SOC205 - ASSIGNMENT ONE - THE STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS

THE STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS
ASSIGNMENT ONE








The State Judicial Selection Process
Strayer University
Felicia McCaw
Professor Clinton Gortney
SOC205
Online Winter 2017
January 31, 2017

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One of the goals in the overall selection of jurists is to maintain first a collective and cognitiveness of the possibility of maintaining neutrality, equality and impartialality with the placing and selecting and retainership of judges. With that in mind is the realization that all judges are human and are influenced by their interactive life dealing with legal and psychological effect of changes in the world to summarily decide and conclude a case.

Cultural bias is also sometimes a conclusive when dealing and administering a case because their “common sense” is tangible and intangible to their societal pivot, structure and point of view. Further all are subjected to internal interpretation and mediatory contemplation when facilitating and exercising judgment in all cases. Therefore, even though preexisting cultural agendas may exist and as such all have to mitigate possible consequences when effectively concluding judgment and appropriately sentence a case. Consequently, interwoven is the realization of conscious and subconscious need for objectivity, fairness, distance and acknowledgment of difference to allocate clarity in dealing with every case.

As such American judges are conscious of prevalent cultural gaps and the necessitated need to view all as prima facie with requirement to have cultural experts to prove otherwise or indeed an untruth. Therefore, this practice supports steps of alleviating thoughts of judicial cultural bias or favoritism, or acts of negative consequence.

Another contention in the selecting of state judges dwells primarily in the majoritarian processes (retention elections or gubernatorial appointment) to establish judicial retention and because of this the ability to compromise judicial independence becomes a prevalent threat and facilitator to increasing negating of judicial independence. As a consequence and key point judicial elections act as a mean to secure and retain independence as well as eliminating merit

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selection and reintroducing partisan elections to address the primary concern and that is securing independence. Therefore, the Due Process Clause helps assure the constitutionality required for judicial independence and effectively seal and guarantee all avenues of fairness.

Since the conservatorship of the judicial system is required to be facilitated and executed by either election, gubernatorial appointment or merit selection this helps to retain the majoritarian interests on the initial selection process and then consequently affects the judicial retention period with steadfast allowance and encouragement to continue. On this concept, the prevalence leans heavily for the jurist and favorably for the litigant to retain fair procedure, judgment with restrictions based exclusively on neutral judicial assessment that deals with facts and laws.

In further contemplation of the appointing of state judges at one time all judges were appointed whether for the state or the federal by public officials. And they not only had terms that were referred to as life tenure which allowed the seating on the bench for a lifetime but this progressively changed with the limitations of terms in conjunction with appointment and through popular elections. As it stands to reason both tenure and selection are both processes or metrics of judicial independence. In consequence, the division or change caused a catalystic evolution of the manner the state and federal courts attends in regard to the law and its judicial process. In effect the state courts prevalency to conduct and hear a case is heavily dependent upon the constitutional level of the status of the case and its ability to regulate authority to consequently hear and address the issue at hand.

Therefore, the approach to the constitution is only prevalent to interpretation buts it facilitory right to be applicable in all courts vs just the level of the federal supreme court authority in manners can be heard at the state level as well as the federal. All manners of

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challenge do not necessarily mean federal as well as all manners do not necessarily mean state level only in the manner of cases to be heard.

Contextual meaning is always a step in determining the manner of case law as well as allow context the ability to change due to differentiating circumstances that might affect its effectiveness or cause an unmitigating sameness. Further in relation to translation these too help in the cause of incorporating originalist-friendly ways to help adjust circumstantial change in relation to constitutional interpretation.

Another point in the manner of structural independence allows a freedom to uphold the independence level and acts of fairness because of 1) Diversity, 2) Interpretation, 3) Commonality of cases, and 4) Electoral selection. This effectively allows steadfast attention of state judges to act with clarity, interpretation and thoroughness to fulfill jurisdictionary right. Further that judges are guardians of the constitution and are dependent on retainership of the dignity, honor and retrospective idealism of America as intended by the founders of this country and as such do not have to be levied to the pressure of securing or pleasing a segmentation of the populace to secure their right to full tenure.

Also, that acts of right are continuance and steadfast associated with the state or act of “good behavior” that ensures the completeness of term and the fortitude to stand and act on the right of the constitution as the backbone and faithful guardians of our most beloved constitution the righteous hand of right for all the people.

Therefore, all acts of judicial independence corresponds to the development and strengthening of state judicial selection to facilitate and allow accountability as well as conceptualized safety, freedom and enforcement of ideas. Consequently, supporting judicial

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elections of the state and federal level by the utilizing of partisan, non-partisan and merit selection with the ability to prevail understanding of the framework of once again with emphasis on judicial independence.

With the likelihood of judicial independence comes the ability to make distinctions between an electoral voting and an appointing of state judges to fulfill the legislative purpose. Further in relational value the political accountability emerged early with the allowance of local judges to be secured and held to account for cases of active, present and those to be presented.

Therefore, all states have different approaches to appoint state judges using either the partisan, non-partisan, merit, or combination of merit or other appointment methodology for initial selection. The states that do not use elections to secure judges are primarily done by the governor or legislative or a commission based on qualifications either through official or unofficial mechanisms. Further since life tenure is not applicable the ability of retention is the idealistic way when using the “Missouri Plan which is equitable to merit selection” to retain seat and position.

In relation to retention a state judge is critiqued as to his or her performance, ethical outlook, presentation, rating and possible running on a ballot or “party ticket” to continue. Because of this those running on a ballot have a high probability of being retained as a state judge because they are already in an incumbent position and have sufficient support to prevail.

The State of Michigan as reflected of the above-mentioned characteristics for selecting state court judges consist of non-partisans elections and whereby they serve in state trial courts, state courts of last resort that cover general jurisdiction for full terms. In order to retain their position on the bench they must run for re-election.

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Seven justices or jurists for the Michigan Supreme Court are selected by non-partisan elections at which they serve for eight year terms and have to be re-elected to continue. Furthermore, incumbent judges must file an affidavit of candidacy to request being placed on a ballot whereas non-incumbent candidates must file a nominating petition or acquire a partisan nomination at a party convention.

The chief justice of this court is allowed to serve a two year term and is elected by his fellow justices. Some of the qualifications needed to be elected to this court require a judge to be a qualified elector, licensed to practice law in the State of Michigan, have at least five years of law practice, be under the age of 70 and if they have obtained the age of 70 be allowed to serve out the remainder of their term. Further if a mid-term vacancy occurs the governor will appoint a replacement to serve until the next general election with the state bar’s committee on the basis of judicial qualification interviews, with evaluation and rating of all candidates and confidential reports.

For the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Circuit Court there are 28 judges for the Appeals Court and 221 judges for the Circuit Court with allowance of a six year term. As with the Supreme Court the justices are chosen through non-partisan elections and have to run for re-election. Candidates are placed on ballot via non-partisan primaries of by nominating petitions.

The chief judge of the Appeal and Circuit Courts are chosen or selected by Supreme Court appointment with terms lasting two years. As such to be elected to either the Court of Appeals or the Circuit Court a judge must be a qualified elector of his or her district, licensed to practice law in the State of Michigan have five years of law practice and be under the age of 70 and if the judge (sitting judge) has reached the age of 70 they are allowed to serve out the

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remainder of term, If on occurrence a vacancy appears on the Appeals or Circuit Court, the process is identical to the procedure used by the Supreme Court and with the assistance of the judicial qualifications committee the governor selects a replacement to serve until the next general election.

Under the limited jurisdiction courts for Michigan, judges are elected to the District Court and Probate Court for six year terms. For both courts the election to this court are non-partisan contested elections, qualified elector of the district and under the age of 70 and have five years of practicing law.

Lastly, the Juvenile Court judges are elected to four year terms by non-partisan contested elections, must be a qualified elector of the district, licensed to practice law in Michigan and be under the age of 70.

The State of Illinois advocated methodology for selecting judges for full terms is by supportive authority. For the State Court partisan election of judges occurs through partisan elections followed by non-partisan retention elections. For the Supreme and Appellate Court the seven justices of the Illinois Supreme Court and the forty-two judges of the Illinois Appellate Court are selected in an identical manner with judges being chosen by popular vote in partisan elections and who serve ten year terms after which they must compete in uncontested non-partisan retention elections to continue serving.
Unlike Michigan, the supreme and appellate court justices in Illinois are elected to represent specific districts and the seven districts are divided among five districts (three allocated to Cook County and the others divided evenly among the other four districts) and are voted into office by the resident of their respective regions.

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The qualifications to serve on either of these two courts a judge must be a U.S. citizen, a district resident and licensed to practice law in Illinois. The selection of the chief justice or judge of the supreme court is chosen by peer vote to serve a three year term with the chief judge of appellate courts being selected as well by peer vote to serve for only one year. Further in the event of a midterm vacancy the Illinois Supreme Court is responsible for appointing an interim judge. This judge serves until the next general election occurs at least 60 days after his or her appointment at which point the judge must run in a partisan election to continue serving.

There are 513 judges on the Illinois Circuit Court who are elected in partisan elections to six year terms and at completion judges that wish to continue must compete in uncontested non-partisan retention elections. The chief judge of each circuit court as with the supreme and appellate court is selected by peer vote that he or she serves in that capacity indefinitely. Further the circuit courts are also served by 391 associate judges who are limited in that they may not preside over cases in which the defendant is charged with a felony (an offense punishable by one or more years in prison). Associate judges are appointed to four year terms by circuit judges and mid-term vacancies are filled by Illinois Supreme Court appointment as they are on the other courts.

During the examining of Michigan and Illinois, there is a prevalency of consistency of appointing of judges with terms designated, procedure of selecting judges, jurisdiction allowances or segmented sectors that the court covers. In contrasting Michigan to Illinois, Illinois is the more approachable with terms lasting not as long and probably more easier to obtain a starting position, experience and understanding. But the difference lies in the voting and term year for the Supreme and Appellate Court of Illinois vs Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of Michigan. Also, the circuit court is first partisan then non-partisan to retain position in Illinois but in Michigan the circuit court and appeals court is non-partisan and then have to run

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for re-election to continue. Further Illinois supreme and appellate courts cover segmented districts of seven and the judges are voted into office by the residents of their respective regions whereas in Michigan the court of appeals and circuit court require residents to be a qualified elector of his or her district to be elected. The judges for the court of appeals and circuit court in Michigan are allowed a term of six years whereas in Illinois the judges for the supreme and appellate court are allowed a term of ten years. Both states require license to practice law and be a U.S. citizen to be a judge. The chief justice of the supreme court in Michigan is selected by his or her fellow justices for two years whereas in Illinois the chief justice is selected to serve by peer vote for three years and the chief judge is selected by peer vote for one year.

Both Michigan and Illinois have exacting criteria to meet to be a judge and that is to be a qualified elector, be licensed to practice law in the state with Michigan limiting the age of under 70 and if a sitting judge then allowance to finish term. In the case of vacancy of a judgeship position both Illinois and Michigan have authority allocated to fill position in Michigan by the governor and in Illinois by the Illinois Supreme Court in the supreme courts. In the case of Michigan, the steps needed to remove a judge from his post for disciplinary action consist of one of the following steps:

• Judges can be impeached by a majority vote of the house of representatives and convicted by 2/3 vote of the senate.
• The governor has authority to remove a judge upon the concurrent resolution of 2/3 of the members of both houses of the legislature.
• The supreme court may censure, suspend, retire or remove a judge based on the recommendation of the Judicial Tenure Commission. However, the Judicial Tenure Commission has no authority to actively protest a Supreme Court Justice or prevail upon removal.

whereas in Illinois, judges may be removed by one of the two following ways:

• The Judicial Inquiry Board files complaint with the courts commission and after notice and hearing, the commission may reprimand, censure, suspend, retire or remove a judge.
• Judges may be impeached by a majority of votes by the house of representatives and removed by a 2/3 vote of the senate.

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During the comparison of Michigan to Illinois, the more approachable appears to be the Illinois court system because of the flexibility and the comparative amount of time that can be allocated to each judgeship position. Also, if starting out the procedural methodology would be enabled to be absorbed because of a starting position and then allowance of a continuance upward as experience is garnered and obtained through the various cases and court systems that allow multiplicity as well as thoroughness in learning the law and its applicable challenges and escapades in each court room.




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